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express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or
responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or useful-
ness of any information, apparatus, product or process
disclosed or represents that its use would not infringe
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ABSTRACT
Some of the important technical issues involved in the
implementation of a spent fuel storage regime under inter-
national auspices are discussed. In particular, we consider:
the state of the art as far as the different possible storage
modes are concerned, the relevant accident, sabotage, and
transportation considerations, and the impact of recent
technical spent fuel safeguards initiatives on the non-
proliferation rationale for international spent fuel management.

I. Introduction
International management of spent nuclear reactor fuel
has been proposed as a response to the following nonprolifera-
tion concerns:
1. Energy resource and waste management considerations
have been advanced in support of the argument for closing
the fuel cycle via reprocessing of spent fuel. A spent fuel
storage regime is seen as providing a viable alternative to
immediate reprocessing, while retaining this option for a
future time when the cost/benefit tradeoffs involved in insur-
ing a long-term fission option via the fast breeder reactor
becomes clearer.
2. Large amounts of spent fuel in national hands, es-
pecially fuel which has been out of core for a long period
of time, is seen as an invitation to nuclear mischief via
covert or overt seizure fllowed by reprocessing-in a dedicated
facility.
In this report we briefly address some of the important
technical issues involved in the implementation of a long-
term, retrievable spent fuel storage regime. These issues
can be summarized as follows:
1. In general, what is the state of the art as far as
the different interim storage modes are concerned? In par-
ticular,
a. What is the nature of the tension between retaining
the option for eventual reprocessing and the option for permanent
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disposal?
b. What length of time must spent fuel remain
underwater before dry surface, near-surface or geologic
storage becomes feasible?
2. What are the relevant accident, sabotage, and trans-
portation considerations? How do these differentiate between
the storage modes?
3. What impact would recent technical initiatives to
upgrade IAEA safeguards on spent fuel stored in reactor water
basins have on the nonproliferation rationale for international
management?
4. How high is the spent fuel radiation barrier to di-
version and reprocessing as a function of time?
These issues are addressed in the following. In par-
ticular, Section IIis devoted to a technical description of the
various storage concepts, while Section IIIand IV discuss
environmental impacts and transportation. Our tentative con-
clusions and recommendations are summarized in Section V,
while the safeguards and radiation barrier issues are taken up
in Appendices A and B, respectively.
II. Alternative Spent Fuel Storage Modes
For orientation we present in Figure 1 a generic view
of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, which illustrates
the role of the various interim storage modes. As indicated,
the basic uncertainty at this time is associated with the
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role of the geologic mode. At first glance, the idea of
engineering this mode, which is normally associated with
ultimate disposal of high level waste, in a manner compatible
with long term retrievability seems very attractive. (Short
term retrievability, for safety purposes, is always a design
requirement.) However, there are important technical con- -
siderations which argue for reserving the
geologic mode for disposal, not storage. We consider this
question, and the other uncertainties indicated in Figure 1,
i.e., the length of time under water before dry storage
becomes feasible and the packaging requirements associated
with the different branches of the option space, in some
detail below. Before beginning our discussion of the different
storage modes, it is appropriate to note thatthe new element
in the concept of interim storage at the back end of the fuel
cycle is the emphasis on spent fuel rather than the solidified
high level radioactive waste. Most of the storage modes dis-
cussed here for the former application have already been con-
sidered for the latter,( ' 2 ) and much of the analysis is
applicable with some modification.
A, Storage Under Water
The handling and storage of radioactive materials under
water is a standard method of operation in the nuclear industry.
In particular, spent fuel has been routinely stored in water
basins for many years; e.g., the first reactor pool--associated
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with operations of the Manhattan District--was put into
service in the US in 1943, and the first commercial pools
for storage of PWR, BWR and HWR spent fuel were completed in
1957, 1960, and 1962, respectively. While the concept of
extended water storage of spent fuel is new, de facto, with
the delay in reprocessing, both spent fuel and experience
in storing it have been accumulating over the years, both in
the US and abroad. In addition, extended water storage of
solidified high level waste in canisters was considered by
the National Academy of Sciences Panel on Engineered Storage
and the AEC in 1974-75.(1,2) However, bare spent fuel differs
from canned high level waste with respect to such factors as
potential corrosion mechanisms and criticality, and specific
questions have been raised regarding the integrity of spent
fuel in extended water storage. An assessment of these con-
cerns has been undertaken by A.B. Johnson, Jr. His reported
results(3 ) and some related considerations are summarized in
b below; to supply some context, we first review briefly the
current practice in spent fuel water storage.
(a) The typical spent fuel water basin is a rectangular
ttub" with walls below ground level composed of several
feet of reinforced concrete lined with a water tight barrier
such as stainless steel or fiberglass. Spent LWR assemblies
are housed upright in racks mounted on the bottom of the pool, 
apDroDriate rack spacing and construction provide assurance
agairst accidental criticality.
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(Criticality precautions are unnecessary for
spent HWR fuel stored under ordinary (not heavy) water, and
the short (0.5m) fuel bundles are stacked in baskets with
typically 32 bundles per basket.) The use of stainless
steel or boron-impregnated stainless steel instead of alumi-
num racks permits roughly a factor of 1.5-2 decrease in rack
spacing, and hence a factor of 2-4 increase in storage density.
For example, the planned "reracking" of the U.S. Trojan PWR
reactor pool with an original design capacity of 280 assemblies
will permit the storage of approximately 650 assemblies; this
corresponds to an increase in capacity from 4/3 to 10/3 of
a full core (the normal annual discharge is 1/3 of a full
core). The use of high density racks is an obvious, straight-
forward but limited solution to the growing shortage of space
in reactor pools.
All spent fuel handling operations; e.g., transfer from
the reactor to the racks in the reactor pool and any subse-
quent transfer to truck or rail casks for shipment to an
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), takes
place under water. Cask loading in a reactor basin and loading
and unloading in a water ISFSI takes place in a separate pool
adjacent to the storage area which is designed to withstand
accidental drop of a massive cask. Standard operating procedure
also includes decontamination of incoming and outgoing casks be-
fore and after they are placed in the cask loading/unloading pool.
Adequate water pumping and heat exchanger capacity in
a closed circuit system is provided to insure that the radio-
active heat generated by the fuel--which can be quite high for
r;
fuel recently out of core -- does not cause the bulk water
temperature to rise above 40C. Radioactivity in storage
pool waters is due to the presence of fission products from
the fuel and neutron activation products from crud deposited
on the fuel during reactor operation. Filtration and ion
exchange are the principal methods for control of these
species as well as other particulate and dissolved impurities
such as chloride ion. The water pool chemistry is usually
sampled on a weekly basis, and monitors for airborne radio-
activity operate continuously above the pools. The radiation
dose rate at the water surface of current generation pools
is less than 1 mrem/hr.
Regulatory guidance specifying requirements for design,
site selection (including acceptable geology, meteorology,
hydrology, and water supply), and physical protection of pool
storage facilities is based, in the U.S., on USNRC Guides
3.24 and 1.13 for independent pools and pools at reactors,
respectively.
(b) The intuition that storage under water is a viable
option for the long-term is usually inferred from the fact
that the carefully controlled pool envrionment is much more
benign than that existing inside a reactor core where the
fuel has been sitting for periods in the range of one to three
years (the shorter/longer times are characteristic of HWR/LWR
fuel). Hence fuel that survived reactor exposure without
developing defects would be expected to age gracefully under
water, while defective fuel which fails during storage would
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do so in a noncatastrophic manner and could be isolated from the
pool water in closed canisters. Johnson's survey(3) of U.S.,
Canadian, and European water storage experience and possible fuel and
fuel cladding degradation mechanisms largely confirms this argument.
In particular, he observes that:
(1) Both Zircalloy-clad and stainless steel clad uranium oxide
fuel have been stored under water for long periods of time with no
evidence that fuel bundle materials are degrading, based on visual
inspections and radiation monitoring.(4)
Observed fuel failure rates are low (%0.01-0.1%), and fuel
assemblies with defective rods can usually be stored without special
procedures. However, special equipment has been developed to handle
failed fuel; e.g., containment of "leakers" in closed cannisters.
(2) Extrapolation of available experimental evidence
suggests that known corrosion mechanisms such as cladding oxidation
pose no threat to fuel integrity in water storage.
(31 Oxidation of UO2 to U308 at fuel defects occurs very
slowly at pool temperatures. However, the reaction rate increases
rapidly with temperature, and at temperatures which may be attained
in dry storage (=300°C), substantial oxidation can occur, assuming,
of course, that an oxidant is available. The relevance of this to
various dry storage options is discussed below.
(4) To insure the credibility of water storage over the
long-term, additional research is needed in several areas, in-
cluding: possible effects of pool temperature and water
chemistry transients--such as might occur during loss-of-
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cooling capability accident--on the subsequent condition of
stored fuel, the behavior of fuel defects as a function of
defect type, cladding type and storage conditions, the effects
of galvanic couples on the hydriding of zirconium alloys, and
the definition of special effects such as crud layer environ-
ments and crevice corrosion. A low-level, selective spent
fuel surveillance regime should be instituted as an integral
part of this research program.
In conclusion, it appears that optimism regarding ex-
tended water storage is justified. The technology is well-
established, and this mode is the logical reference case since
water storage is the inevitable first step in any spent fuel
regime. To be sure, no absolute assurance that spent fuel
can be stored retrievably either under water or in a
passive mode for periods up to 100 years can be given today,
and in this sense statements--made; e.g., at the recent
Windscale inquiry in support of the application of British
Nuclear Fuels, Ltd. (BNFL) to build on oxide reprocessing
plant--to the effect that long term storage may lead to
severe and costly deterioration problems, cannot be dismissed
out of hand.
However, at least for the mid-term (up to say 25 years),
the weight of available scientific evidence and operational
experience in water storage inspires confidence that immediate
reprocessing is not a technical requirement to insure ultimate
retrievability of spent fuel.
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B. Dry Storage
Dry storage of spent fuel becomes a viable option after
it has cooled to the point where passive heat transfer from
encapsulated fuel to its environment is efficient enough to
insure that the fuel element temperatures are well below values
which would lead to significant degradation over the long-term.
Most of the known failure mechanisms are strongly temperature
dependent. For example, as previously noted, recent experi-
mental evidence(5) indicates that U2 exposed at a cladding
defect to temperatures 300°C will rapidly oxidize in air to
U308, causing swelling and splitting of the cladding with
exposure of more fuel, and ultimately release of finely powdered
U308 and fission products. To avoid this situation, one can
either restrict the out-of-core age of fuel/encapsulation method
"space" to insure that fuel temperatures remain well below
300°C, or eliminate the risk of fuel oxidation by replacing
the air atmosphere inside the canister containing the fuel with
an inert environment. Current thinking--based on moving fuel
from reactor basin to dry storage as soon as possible, and
simplifying the procedure for eventual reprocessing--favors
the latter course with helium filled canisters (helium also
provides convenient leak detection). However, a view of dry
storage as a de facto disposal mode would dictate different
design requirements. This example illustrates the issues
involved in engineering what is basically--as compared to
water storage--a new, albeit straightforward technology.
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Three basic techniques for surface or near-surface storage
are presently being considered in the U.S., Canada, and Western
Europe: the dry well or caisson, the sealed cask, and the
air-cooled vault. In the following we briefly discuss these
modes as well as the concept of retrievable geologic storage.
The Dry Well or Caisson (Fig. 2)
In the dry well or caisson concept, canned fuel is stored
below ground level in lined, vertical shafts which are sealed
at the top for radiation shielding purposes. The rationale
for this approach is that reliance on the soil for heat disper-
sion by conduction to the ground surface, for radiation attenua-
tion, and for physical protection, minimizes capital and operat-
ing costs, and provides a safe, economic alternative to long-
term under water storage with easy retrievability. On paper,
this concept--which has been developed over the past several
years by the Atlantic Richfield Company and is now also being
studied by the U.S. D.O.E.(6)--looks quite attractive. The
storage holes would be constructed as needed on a square grid;
with a spacing of 20-25 feet, storage of the spent fuel from
%1 GWe-yr of LWR operation would require approximately one
acre of land, assuming one PWR assembly per dry well. Heat
transfer is by radiation and convection (primarily the former
for young fuel) from the fuel to the can and from the can to
the hole liner, and then by conduction through the soil to
the atmosphere. The major design variables which determine
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the permissible decay heat load--and hence the age and amount of
fuel which can be stored--are the soil conductivity, the hole
spacing, and the hole diameter. Fig. 3, taken from Reference 6,
illustrates the strong dependence of the can temperature on the
soil conductivity. It has been claimed(7) that spent fuel aged 2-3
years under water can be stored in wells spaced 25 feet apart with-
out exceeding a fuel cladding temperature of %380°C 715°F,
assuming a soil conductivity of 0.2 Btu/hr-ft-°F. (The indicated,
allowable temperature is based on not exceeding two-thirds of
the cladding rupture stress of PWR fuel rods.)(6 ) However, this
result is derived from computer heat transfer analysis and
awaits experimental confirmation. The heavy reliance on the
soil is both the basic attraction and a potential drawback of
this storage concept.
The Sealed Cask (Fig. 4)
In contrast to the dry well, in the storage cask method
fuel is stored in units which are self-shielding, cooling and
protecting. Each cask is a hollow reinforced concrete cylinder
sitting on a concrete base. The spent fuel is contained in
a steel can at the center of the cylinder, with possibly a thin
lead layer between the fuel can and the concrete walls. (Lead
is a much better shielding material than concrete, and its
use reduces te thickness of concrete required.) In the U.S.,
a similar design was recommended by the National Academy Panel
on Engineered Storage (2)as the optimum method for interim
storage of high level radioactive waste (the dry well was not
1.
considered). In this application, natural draft air circula-
tion through an annulus between the shield and the fuel can
was necessary to remove the heat being generated at the design
rate of 5 KW. However, since the heat rate per unit volume of
aged spent fuel is lower than that of high level waste(8) a
sealed cask design seems feasible for the former. This route
has been actively pursued at the Whiteshell Nuclear Research
Establishment (WNRE) in Canada, where a development and demon-
stration program was started in 1974.(9) Tests at WNRE have
verified that at a design heat load of 2KW, corresponding to
storage of 4.4MT of CANDU HWR fuel cooled for five years, the
fuel cladding temperature is acceptably low (200°C). (A
similar heat load would be obtained from .6MT of five-year
cooled LWR fuel.) Besides fuel integrity, the other major
potential materials problem associated with the cask concept
is degradation of the concrete shield due to thermal stresses.
That is, at heat rates in the range 1.5 to 2KW, the high
temperatures at the internal concrete wall result in tensile
stresses on the outside surface which exceed the maximum tensile
stress of the concrete. Under these conditions, surface
cracking is predicted; however, it was expected that the re-
inforcing steel would prevent the cracks from growing to the
point where the structural or shielding integrity of the
concrete woul be compromised. Initial tests(9) have veri-
fied that surface cracking is minimal, even at higher than
design heat loads (5KW) with the casks subjected to simulated
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freeze-thaw cycles. (The fact that heat transfer through the
concrete was much better than predicted undoubtedly was a major
factor in these results.)
These results are encouraging, but more work is needed
to insure the ability of the concrete to provide an effective
shield for periods 50 years. In this regard, treating the
outer surface to increase its emissivity (thus lowering the
heat load from the sun and increasing the permissible decay
heat load) and to slow down weathering would be a major im-
provement.
The Air-Cooled Vault (Fig. 5 )
In comparison to water cooling, both the dry well and
the sealed cask are low density storage modes. (The minimum
spacing of sealed casks--on the order of 25 feet--is determined
more by the need for access than heat transferconsiderations. )
A dry storage concept with a packing density of the same order
as water storage is the air-cooled vault. In this system, the
fuel is contained within canisters and secondary canisters, or
overpacks, and stored in closely spaced vertical stacks in a
large concrete bunker which is constructed partially below
grade to reduce the radiation shielding and physical protec-
tion requirements. Heat removal occurs by natural convection
of air flowing directly through the vault with the chimney
effect of the hot airrising from the fuel providing the circula-
tion. As with water storage and the concrete cask, the vault
was previously considered in the U.S.(1 2 ) for the storage of
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high level waste, and is now being reconsidered along with
the dry well and concrete cask by the U.S. D.O.E. in their
Spent Unprocessed Fuel (SURF) Facility Program. The convec-
tion vault concept has also been studied in Canada along
with a variation, the conduction vault. (10 ) In both schemes,
the CANDU fuel bundles are precast into zinc cylinders in an
aluminum mold before canning to improve the containment and
heat transfer. In the conduction vault variation, the fuel
canisters are stacked tightly together and closed at the top
by a finned aluminum shield plug. Heat flows up the canisters
by conduction through the zinc castings and is dissipated to
the air by the shield plug fins. No cooling air enters the
fuel area of the vault. This reduces the possibility that
activity could become suspended in the exhaust air, at the
"price" of less efficient cooling as compared with the con-
vection vault. Important uncertainties with both schemes
include: can the zinc be melted easily to allow recovery of
the fuel, how much reduction in air flow can be tolerated,
and is there any interaction between the zinc and zircaloy
during casting or later in storage?
Geologic Retrievable Storage
Although the tension between reprocessing and ultimate
disposal arises in all dry storage modes, it is felt most
keenly in the case of geologic storage. On the one hand,
it has long been appreciated that the plasticity and good
thermal conductivity of salt make salt beds an attractive
14
candidate medium for ultimate disposal of radioactive waste.
On the other hand, the corrosive attack of included brine
which tends to migrate up thermal gradients towards the heat
source, and mechanical deformation of the salt at high tempera-
tures demands a high degree of conservatism in packaging and
thermal loading in order to keep open the retrievability option
for an extended period of time. For example, DOE has recently
estimated(11 ) that the thermal loading of a generic salt re-
pository at a depth of 2000 feet must be restricted to 36KW/acre
if 25-year retrievability is to be assured, while keeping the
retrievability option open only for a five year initial "shake-
down" period would allow densities of ]50KW/acre. For non-salt
formations such as basalt, granite, and shale, corrosive attack
is not known to be a problem (current knowledge of canister-rock
interactions is meager), but similar heat loading retrievability
restrictions exist. -Although it would be nice "to have your
spent fuel and dispose of it too," the geologic mode is probably
best reserved for ultimate disposal of either spent fuel or high
level waste.
III. Environmental Impact
The greatest potential hazard to the public from stored
spent fuel is the release of radioactivity due to either missile
impact or containment failure via loss of coolant. However,
even if the radioactive release in some accident, natural
disaster, or sabotage attempt were limited, the retrievability
option might still be significantly degraded and a large amount
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of fuel might have to be relocated in a short period of time.
Given the relative state-of-the-art in water and dry storage, one
would expect that statements relating to the environmental im-
pact of the former would be much more definitive. This situation
is reflected in the draft generic environmental statement re-
cently issued by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (12)
Indeed, the discussion of normal and abnormal events and their
consequences is entirely confined to water storage. Their basic
conclusions can be summarized as follows:
(1) Pool water and air quality can be easily monitored
(there is essentially only one process stream), and the en-
vironmental impact of normal operation is nil (e.g., the volume
of wastes associated with water cleanup is about 2m3/GWe-yr
with a maximum associated radioactivity of about 10 Ci/GWe-yr
of beta-gamma activity).
(2) The environmental impact of such events as: fires,
explosions, earthquakes, missile accidents (e.g., tornado-
driven utility poles penetrating the storage building and
landing in the pool), and accidental criticality is small.
This confidence is based primarily on the fact that the fuel
sits below grade, under a minimum of 12 feet of water, sur-
rounded by walls of reinforced concrete which are typically
six feet thick. Moreover, besides the basin itself all im-
portant auxiliary equipment such as fuel handling cranes and
crane supports are designed to prevent collapse of structures
into the pool which could damage the fuel.
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(3) A loss of cooling capability is potentially serious,
but the large heat capacity of the pool water should provide
adequate time for corrective action to be taken. We illustrate
this point with an idealized (calometric) calculation:
Assume that a 30 foot deep, 1,000 MT capacity storage
pool contains 106 gallons of water and is loaded to capacity
with fuel whose average heat rate is 10W/kg, corresponding to
PWR fuel which has been out of core for one year. Then the
total heat rate is
1000 MTx 10kw = 7 joules 3.6 x 10 sec1000 MT = 10 x MT sec hr
= 3 6 x 10 joules = 3 4x107 Btu/hr
hr B
and the resultant temperature rise
10 joules3.6 xlO hr
= 2.3 C/hr.4.18 joules 3.77x10gm x 6 gallons
gm C gallon x 10 gallons
Assuming the ambient water temperature was 40°C at the time
cooling was lost, it would take roughly 60°C/2.3°C/hr = 26
hours to reach boiling. To maintain the water level under
boiling conditions would require makeup water to be supplied
from an emergency source at a rate of
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36x10 joules 1 hr3.6x10 hr x 60 min
540 calories 4.19 joules
gm calorie
3.77 x 10 gm
x gallon
70 gallons
min
This is a modest requirement, and could be supplied from several
sources; e.g., the ultimate heat sink. However, if makeup was
not supplied, the top of the fuel assemblies would begin to be
exposed in about 4 days.
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To these remarks, we would add the following preliminary
observations:
(1) Almost by definition, a dispersed storage mode would
be less affected by abnormal events of limited geographi-
cal scope, and this would tend to favor the dry well and
sealed cask as compared with pool storage and air-cooled
vaults. In particular, low seismicity would be a site
selection criterion for all modes, but it would be of
greater importance for the latter. The "other side of
the dispersion coin" is that the task of surveillance
and monitoring for evidence of containment deterioration
and abnormal activity becomes more difficult.
(2) As a corollary to the above, canned spent fuel either
in a hole in the ground, or surrounded by a thick con-
crete shield would be relatively immune to severe
damage via tornado, earthquake, airplane crashes, or
sabotage using conventional explosives. The cask might
be toppled off its pedestal and/or cracked, but the enviro-
mental impact would be small.
(3) Besides the fuel cladding all dry storage modes rely
on multiple barriers to contain possible radioactive
releases. For all modes, more materials research and
development is needed to assure the long-term reliability
of these barriers, taking into account the possibility of
accelerated rates of corrosion of metals or weathering
of concrete under abnormal conditions.
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(4) Of the dry storage modes, both loss of cooling capability,
and criticality accidents would be more credible, and
potentially more serious in the case of theconvection
vault.
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IV. TRANSPORTATION
An LWR shuts down annually to replace about 1/5 to 1/3
of its core. Storage of the discharged fuel at the reactor
pool for a period of 150 days permits radiation levels and
decay heat loads to diminish by roughly a factor of 100 as
compared to levels immediately after discharge, and makes
feasible shipment in massive casks (called "flasks" in Eng-
land) which incorporate gamma and neutron shielding and
provide cooling for the fuel. As with pool storage itself,
shipping spent fuel in casks is not a new technology; i.e.,
present cask designs have evolved from experience gained since
the mid-1940's in shipping fuel from commercial, military, and
research reactors. There has been comparable experience in
Europe, where from 1966 through 1975 about 590 MT of spent
(13)
LWR fuel was shipped to reprocessing facilities. Casks
are usually classified according to the primary transport
mode (truck or rail; a few designs can go either way) and the
nature of thecoolant (water or air). Truck/rail casks now
available or under construction weigh up to 35 MT/100 MT fully
loaded. Naturally, the large rail casks have a higher fuel
capacity and their use substantially decreases the number of
shipments and the loading and unloading capacity required for
a given amount of fuel. For example, the Nuclear Fuel Services
NFS-4 truck cask weighs 22 MT, has a uel capacity of 0.5 MT U
(uranium), (1 PWR/2 BWR assemblies), and a 2% payload while the
corresponding figures for the National Lead Industries NLI
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10/24 rail cask are 97 MT, 4.7 MT U (10 PWR/24 BWR assemblies)
and 5%, respectively. (12) Unfortunately, not all reactors
have access to rail facilities--only about half of those in
the US--and truck transport is now and will continue to be
an inevitable part of the spent fuel transportation picture.
An aspect of the use of small capacity casks which is relevant
to the rate of removal of spent fuel from basin storage is the
typical cask turn-around time for shipping to international
storage facility. Assuming that two NSF-4 type casks are avail-
able, and that it takes:
(a) approximately one day for loading, decontamination,
sealing, checking, etc. of each cask before shipment from a
PWR reactor pool,
(b) about the same amount of time for similar operations
at the other end, and
(c) about four days in transit,
it would take more than a year from the time of reactor dis-
charge for all 64 PWR spent fuel assemblies to have been
shipped off the reactor site, assuming shipment to have started
150 days after discharge. The purpose of this example is to
illustrate the potential magnitude of the "dead-time" transport
problem. Not only does the fuel need someplace to go, but it
takes some time to get there.
Related to the above is the question of cask availability.
With the delay in reprocessing, the economic incentive for
building casks has declined, and the number presently
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available/under construction--13/9 in the US and 14/6 in
Western Europe--is insufficient for shipment of large
quantities of spent fuel. However, there is no reason to
believe that--given sufficient priority and economic incentive--
fabrication of casks according to designs already licensed,
should be a major bottleneck. (The NRC has estimated fabrica-
tion times of 10 months to 3 years for a truck cask, and from
1.5-4 years for a rail cask.(12)) In order to receive a
license for a new cask, an applicant must demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and
the Department of Transportation (DOT) that the cask provides
required containment, shielding, criticality control, and heat
transfer under both normal and accident conditions. In par-
ticular, a detailed Safety Analysis Report (SAR) must be
filed with the NRC to demonstrate compliance with the applicable
code, 10 CFR Part 71. (Similar IAEA requirements are detailed
in the "Regulations of Radioactive Materials, Safety Series
No. 6.") Since transportation accidents usually involve some
combination of impact, puncture, fire, or submersion in water,
the acceptance tests require evaluation of the cask and its
contents for a 30-foot drop onto a completely unyielding surface,
followed by a 40-inch drop onto a 6-inch diameter pin, followed
by 30 minutes exposure to 1,475°F, followed by 24 hours of
immersion in water. This is a formidable challenge; however,
more extreme scenarios, some involving malevQlent acts, can
be imagined, and a breach of the cask containment with release
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of radioactivity near a highly populated area could have serious
consequences. Per vehicle mile estimates of the probability
of accidents of varying severity and their consequences in
terms of population radiation dose are derived in WASH-1238,
"Environmental Survey of Transportation of Radioactive Materials
To and From Nuclear Power Plants," and are summarized in
reference 12. As might be expected, the accident probability
vs. consequence curves follow the pattern familiar from the
Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400; i.e., serious accidents occur
via a series of improbable events, and hence have a very low
overall probability. This is reassuring; however, location
of any international facility to minimize the total shipping
required and especially that near populated areas makes good
sense.
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V. OBSERVATIONS
Consideration of extended spent full storage has become
necessary with the delay in reprocessing,while the latter
has been driven, especially in the U.S.,by concern about
weapons proliferation via separated plutonium. Thus it seems
fitting to conclude this brief overview with some remarks which
focus on the non-proliferation implications of the technical
aspects of spent fuel management.
1. Spent fuel which has been out of core for less than
%100 years is still protected by a radiation barrier
which necessitates remote handling, and hence is not
as vulnerable as stockpiles of separated, decontaminated
plutonium. (The radiation barrier decreases sharply
after this time due to the decay of Cs-137, the principal
gamma emitter, which has a 30 year half-life). However, the
decrease in the level of the radiation barrier in time
(see Appendix B, Table 2) might make diversion of spent
fuel which is more than 5 years old somewhat easier.
2. Cooling spent fuel at the reactor basin for at least
one year makes good sense in terms of utilization
of at-reactor storage capacity and in view of the
problems associated with shipping intensely radio-
active materials. Waiting for approximately five
years would be even better for ease of transport
(smaller, cheaper casks) and also makes available
the option of moving directly from national wet
storage to international/multinational passive dry
storage with a high degree of confidence in the
long-term integrity of the stored fuel. Moving
from wet to dry storage at an earlier time is
probably technically feasible, but would require
reoptimization to enhance heat transfer, and this
would increase the cost and also might complicate
retrievability if additional packaging is required.
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3. The ability of at-reactor pool spent fuel surveillance to
provide timely, unambiguous verification of attempted di-
version can and should be significantly enhanced irrespective
of the fate of initiatives for international storage. It is
often argued that the political hurdles involved in instituting
tougher safeguards are formidable; perhaps, but similar prob-
lems are involved in establishing an international/multi-
national spent fuel storage regime or bilateral spent fuel
return arrangements; e.g., the singular lack of enthusiasm
of governments for welcoming fuel irradiated in foreign re-
actors. The point is that some spent fuel will always be
in national hands, and non-intrusive electronic surveillance
techniques, while not foolproof, can make a major contribution
to nonproliferation.
4. Despite its attractive features, i.e., a well-developed
technology which permits high storage concentration
with relative ease of access, water storage has the
disadvantage of requiring active cooling and cleanup.
This leads to higher costs for perpetual care compared
with dry storage modes, and greater vulnerability in
the event that all supervision is lost for an extended
period of time because of unstable political conditions,
natural catastrophies, etc. Hence, if water basins
are chosen as the centralized storage mode, consideration
should be given to locating them underground in order
to at least partially offset these vulnerabilities. This
should not involve great additional expense, since, as
previously noted, current practice is to build pools
partially below ground.
5. Both the dry well and the concrete cask concepts
are attractive as backup to water bsis for interim
storage of spent full or radioactive waste. Both
require more development and testing.
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6. As previously indicated, transportation of spent
fuel should not be a major problem from the point
of view of cask requirements, environmental impacts,
or cost. However, multiple shipments with attendant
rehandling increase all these factorsand the public
anxiety about releases of large amounts of activity -
especially via terrorist attack - makes the optimiza-
tion of interim storage logistics a priority item.
The "obvious" solution is colocation of interim
storage either with reprocessing facilities or
geologic formations suitable for disposal, but
which one? The attractive feature of the latter
is the potential for ready conversion to the former
without additional transport, if a decision is made
to close the fuel cycle in this manner. However, tying
these concepts together would preclude early implementation
of an extended storage regime because of the exacting
technical site selection requirements for disposal.
On the other hand, the viability of an extended storage
regime would be compromised by locating it "conveniently"
near an existing or planned reprocessing facility; e.g.,
Cap La Hague or Windscale. 'These considerations. taken
esheeri with the political problem of finding suitable
national sites for a multinational storage facility, have
led to the suggestion(14)that a remote, sparsely populated
island would be a desirable site--initially for storage,
and perhaps later for other fuel cycle activities; e.g., re-
processing and production of methanol via fast reactors.
The political and technical problems involved in finding
suitable locations have led some to characterize this
concept as a "pie in the ocean." However, it should not
be di missed out of hand, if ocly because of the paucity
of possible alternatives. For an interesting discussion
of the particular siting issues involved in the Indian
Ocean area, see reference 15,
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APPENDIX A
SPENT FUEL SAFEGUARDS
The criteria for required levels of physical protection
of nuclear materials under the IAEA regime is spelled out in
INFCIRC/225, Rev. 1, June 1977. There are three categories:
I, II, III, in order of decreasing stringency of safeguards.
In particular, both spent fuel and unirradiated natural or
slightly enriched fresh fuel are in category III which pro-
vides for:
Use and Storage wtihin an area to which access is controlled.
Transportation under special precautions including prior
arrangements among sender, recipient and carrier, and prior
agreement between entities subject to the furisdiction and
regulation of supplier and recipient states, respectively,
in case of international transport specifying time, place and
procedures for transferring transport responsibility. What
this means in terms of current surveillance of spent fuel pools
is the following: The condition of the pool is monitored by
either movie or video cameras on a semi-continuous biS; i.e.,
once every 15-30 minutes, on the presumption that this period
is short compared with the time required to move fuel. The
video tapes are inspected every 3 months, and the movie film
every 6 months. In addition, access to the pool area is moni-
tored by gamma detectors. This is clearly not the last word
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in safeguards because: (1) it is possible to tamper with
the transmission link between camera and tape recorder, and
(2) the inspection interval does not provide timely warning.
Various technical initiatives are under development which,
if implemented, would significantly increase the timeliness
of warning of attempts to divert fuel and/or tamper with the
safeguard system. In particular, a prototype remote surveillance
and interrogation system has been designed and is now being
tested.(1) This system can be operated in various ways to
monitor the status of a storage pool in almost "real-time;"
e.g.,
(a) a TV camera takes a picture of the pool. The picture
is stored as a reference in a memory device. Every minute or
os, the camera takes another picture and compares it with the
one stored in memory. If something has changed, a status module
on the camera transmits an alarm to an on-site multiplexer
and from there to a remote verification unit in; e.g., Vienna
via telephone cable. The primary technical problem is a high
false alarm rate caused by the difficulty in discriminating
between benign events; e.g., changes in lighting over the pool
and the alarm conditions. The same basic system could be
used to send pictures of the pool in almost real time by record-
ing the video, digitizing it, compressing the bandwidth and
transmitting via telephone cable about a minute later. This
technique is called slow scan video.
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(b) A fiber optic cable can be entertwined through all
the spent fuel assemblies and connected directly to a status
module which senses continually in the cable, and transmits
an alarm if there is a break to the on-site multiplexer and
then on to Vienna as above.
The complete system consists of the monitoring units,
on-site multiplexer, and remote verification unit, and was
developed by Atlantic Research under contract to ACDA. It can
accept inputs from a variety of sensors. The motion detector
is built by Fairchild Camera.
Besides this work, special procedures have been developed
by Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd. (AECL) and the IAEA for safe-
guarding the on-power fuelling feature of the safeguard system
are: 
- fuel bundle counters which count the number of bundles
being discharged from the reactor into the storage
bay via the fuel transport system
cameras within the reactor building which can detect
the removal of bundles from the reactor if this is
done in any way other than via the fuel transport
system
- a bundle radioactivity monitor to verify that the
bundles in the storage bay have been irradiated
and are not dummies.
Further details can be found in reference 2.
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APPENDIX B
THE SPENT FUEL RADIATION BARRIER
The attractive feature of spent fuel from the nonpro-
liferation perspective is that access to the contained plu-
tonium is inhibited by the intense gamma radiation field of
the decaying fission products. We illustrate how this
barrier decays as a function of time after discharge by con-
sidering the properties of the spent fuel from a large 1150
MWe Westinghouse PWR of current design. The relevant re-
actor characteristics are: (1)
1. Fuel Burnup: 33,000 MWD/MTU
2. Specific Power: 37.8 MW/MTU
3. Average Fresh Fuel Enrichment: 2.6% U-235
4. Square Fuel Assemblies
a. Side Dimension: 21.4 cm
b. Active Fuel Length: 366 cm
c. Weight of Uranium: 520 kg.
Voluminous data on the nuclide concentrations and gamma
decay energy from U-235 irradiated at a specified thermal
neutron (2,200 m/sec) flux, , for a specified time, T,
and then allowed to decay is available;(2) to extract the
appropriate numbers we use the given reactor characteristics
to compute:
26U-235 atoms 26 kg 6 x 1026 atoms
assembly MTU kg mole 0.52 MTU
235 kg/kg mole assembly
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= 3.46 x 1025
= 37.8 MW/MTU x 3.2 x 1016 fissions/sec/MW
6.66 x 1025 atoms/MTUx 580 x 10 24 cm
atom
= 3.13 x 1013 -2 -1cm sec
7
t = 33,000 MWD/MTU = 873 days 7.54 x 10 sec
37.8 MW/MTU
From Fig. T-11, l1a of Reference 2, we can now find the gamma
power in watts/assembly, S, for some representative times,
T, after discharge:
Table 1
t
Discharge
1 month
150 days
1 year
5 years
10 years
30 years
S
15.2 x 10
17.3 x 103
3.5 x 103
12.1 x 102
208
138
121
To convert S into gamma flux, I, we model the assembly as a
line source of length 366 cm. Then I in watts/cm one meter
from the midplane of an assembly is given by
183 cm
I = 2 I S/366
0 47r(x2+100 2)
-1dx = S tan1 1.83
2 x 366 x 100
= 4.7 x 10- 6 S/cm2.
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To take into account self-absorption by the 264 fuel pins
in the assembly, we average the mass of the fuel over the entire
assembly volume and use the mass absorption coefficient char-
acteristic of the 0.66 Mev fission product gammas from Cs-137,
which makes the principal contribution to the gamma activity
after 150 days. This gives an average reduction in I of ap-
proximately a factor of 5. Thus
I 0.94 x 10 6 S/cm2.
Finally, to get the gamma dose corresponding to the foregoing
gamma flux we again assume that all the fission product gammas
have the effective energy of those from Cs-137, which have a
mass absorption coefficient in water of 0.032 cm2/gm. Since
a dose of one rad represents absorption of 100 ergs/gm, the
close rate D in rad/hr from a gamma flux I in watts/cm is
2 2 7 ~~erg )36x0(e/rD(rads/hr) = I(watts/cm) 0.032(cm2/gm) 107(wagx36xlt/(sec /hr)
100 (ergs/gm rad)
= 11.5 x 10 I (watts/cm 2 )
10S (watts/assembly)
Hence, from Table 1 the gamma dose 1 meter from the midplane
of our PWR assembly at time t after discharge is:
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Table 2
~~~t ~D (rads/hr at 1 meter)
Discharge 1.5 x 106
1 month 1.7 x 15
150 days 3.5 x 104
1 year 1.2 x 104
5 years 2000
10 years 1400
30 years 1200
To get a feel for the barrier represented by these numbers,
4 4we note that complete incapacitation begins at 10 - 2 x 10
rem (equivalent to rad for gamma rays at these energies),
while exposure to about 500 rem will result in one-half of
the individuals so exposed dying. (This is the so-called
LD 50 dose.) Below about 200 rem there are no discernible
near-term effects. From the point of view of ease of com-
mercial reprocessing via the Purex process, less shielding
would be required for old fuel, and there would be less of
a problem with radiation degradation of the organic solvent,
tributyl phosphate, and with attaining commercial Pu de-
contamination levels since; e.g., the hard-to-separate fis-
sion products zirconium and niobium would have decayed to
insignificant levels. The relevance of these matters to re-
processing in a dedicated facility is not clear.
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